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Abstract 
Combining mainly an analysis of To the Lighthouse with one of Orlando, this 
paper argues that Virginia Woolf theorizes a revision of the dominant modernist 
paradigm of subjectivity. Theoretical portions of the essay compare F.T. Marinetti’s 
Futurist texts to Woolf’s nonfiction and theories of temporality and subjectivity from 
Anthony Giddens and G.M. Hyde. In so doing, I theorize a model of subjectivity—
backward subjectivity, based partially in Heather Love’s Feeling Backward: Loss and the 
Politics of Queer History—that treats identity as both individualist and ontologically 
unstable. Woolf’s revision of subjectivity is especially important in consideration with 
theories of temporality, as Giddens suggests. However, borrowing from Michael 
Hollington’s conception of Bergsonian modernist time, I argue that Woolf’s provocative 
reimagining of subjectivity is the product of elastic, rather than reified, time. 
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I. Introduction 
“So much depends, then…upon distance,” Lily Briscoe begins to muse as she 
labors to reach the elusive completion of her painting near the end of To the Lighthouse 
(284); and the same is true for the project at hand. Distances, both physical and temporal, 
provide the basic structure for this study. For Lily Briscoe, distances interfere 
compositionally with her painting—what moments ago “seemed miraculously fixed, was 
now unsatisfactory. The wind had blown the trail of smoke about; there was something 
displeasing about the placing of the ships” (286)—while also reminding her of something 
more personal, as “her feeling for Mr. Ramsay change[s] as he sail[s] further and further 
across the bay” (284). Here, distance is a fact of physical space that shapes experience, 
that is, both compositionally and emotionally, Lily is situated in a position of trying to 
mediate and interpret distances. As she struggles to focus, Lily realizes that she cannot 
“achieve that razor edge of balance between two opposite forces; Mr. Ramsay and the 
picture; which was necessary” (287). For Lily, distance is not merely the placement of 
objects in space or even in time, but the intersection of spatial/temporal distance and her 
feelings of closeness to other people. In other words, Lily’s struggle to create is not 
simply one about the process of mediating between observed landscape and the paint on 
the canvas; it is about something more complex. Mr. Ramsay’s presence in the tenuous 
balance that Lily describes signals us to situate the text’s portrayal of the creative process 
in some larger context.  
 It is this attempt to understand creativity in the context of human relationality that 
launches this study. In both Orlando and To the Lighthouse, Virginia Woolf examines 
characters situated at the intersection of temporal space and the creative self. Both 
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Orlando and Lily, that is, navigate the self and human relationships via their role as 
creators. The ways in which both of these novels feature experimentation with 
temporality is key to understanding how these two characters understand and perform 
selfhood. Indeed, the fact that these two novels were released in such swift succession is 
no accident: I treat them here as two very different but ultimately related instantiations of 
the same paradigm of subjectivity.  
 In deciding to yoke To the Lighthouse and Orlando together for this project, I 
mean to address a few voids in criticism’s discussions of Woolf. As Makiko Minow-
Pinkney points out in her Virginia Woolf and the Problem of the Subject, Orlando is 
“perhaps the most neglected of Woolf’s novels among her critics,” or it used to be, at any 
rate (117). Admittedly, a lot has changed critically since Minow-Pinkney’s book was 
released, but I include this slightly anachronistic criticism not because it remains true but 
because it isolates Orlando’s status as a “joke,” at least in certain critical treatments of 
the text (cit. in Minow-Pinkney 117). Although she cautions us not to confuse that with 
“mere insignificance,” Minow-Pinkney largely lets this formulation stand, presumably 
because Woolf herself is the origin of the statement. Though it risks arrogance, it is worth 
considering the considerable pressure for Woolf to deride a text as transgressive as 
Orlando in this way. In short, I do not accept the minimalization of Orlando in Woolf’s 
oeuvre; by way of Minow-Pinkney’s point that critics have “suggested a certain 
continuity between To the Lighthouse and Orlando” (121), I consider them together here 
in order to claim that the two texts ought not to be thought of as one of Woolf’s headiest 
on the one hand and one of her most lighthearted on the other, but as two pieces doing 
very much the same work, particularly in the realm of temporality. Not only are the two 
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texts published in swift succession, they think coextensively. Without glossing over their 
differences, this project generally wants to encourage critical conversation about To the 
Lighthouse and Orlando as variations on a theme: as two of Woolf’s most meditative 
novels, but also as two texts using different manipulations of time to theorize selfhood 
and its relation to modernity. 
 The secondary critical intervention that I mean to make is inspired first by Merry 
M. Pawlowski’s engaging collection, Virginia Woolf and Fascism, as well as by the 
literary tumult that Filippo Tomasso Marinetti’s founding of Futurism caused at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Pawlowski’s text serves as an instructive example 
about a small but crucial hole in Woolf scholarship that this paper attempts to address: In 
thirteen essays, the collection mentions To the Lighthouse barely a handful of times and 
Orlando not at all. I do not mean to imply that this particular instance of inattention is a 
glaring critical oversight. It actually seems pretty understandable to me: what could two 
of Woolf’s most philosophical and meditative novels have to do with fascism, especially 
given works significantly more ripe for the comparison?  Three Guineas, for instance, 
appears in the titles alone of four of the essays in Pawlowski’s collection. As I will 
explore more fully later, the reason that even novels like Orlando and To the Lighthouse 
might make interesting additions to such a conversation lies at least partially in the 
discourse inaugurated by Italian Futurism1. Considering both its intense cultural impact2 
and its polemicist bent toward misogyny and warmongering, it is actually quite difficult 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hereafter referred to simply as Futurism. As Mary Ann Caws points out, the term Futurism encompasses 
a broad variety of aesthetic and political movements in a variety of nations throughout the early decades of 
the twentieth century. “There are, of course, many Futurisms even in Italy,” Caws points out (168-9). For 
the sake of simplicity, I am confining my use of the term to reflect only a relatively basic and narrow set of 
texts written by or responding to Marinetti. 
2 q.v. Caws, 169.	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to ignore Futurism’s literary and cultural influence, especially when we consider 
academics’ long history of feminist readings of Woolf’s texts and even Woolf’s own 
adoption of a pacifist stance by 1938, when Three Guineas is published (Gordon). Of 
course, I do not mean to propose any direct correlation between the discourses of 
Futurism and Woolf’s novels, but rather that in defining the concept of subjectivity at 
hand here, such texts prompt us to ask indispensible contextual questions. It is in this 
sense that I think a critical conversation about the relationship between Woolf’s novels 
and Futurism—as ostensibly unrelated as the two may be—is utterly crucial to Woolf 
scholarship. 
 
In the coming sections, I will argue that taken together, To the Lighthouse and 
Orlando provide us with a theorization of selfhood that engages with and alters the 
archetypical high modernist version of selfhood. Instead of the forward-driving, 
antihistorian figure cut by so many personalities of British and Continental modernism, 
Woolf describes subjects that partake only partially in such a discourse of avant-gardist 
individualism. As creator-characters—and specifically as women—Orlando and Lily do 
both stand, in some fashion, alone against literary history that they reject, but they 
simultaneously—and paradoxically—reject the personality-cultish version of self that 
often goes along with such a position. Specifically by examining the relationship between 
these characters and the concept of temporality, I argue that Woolf theorizes a backward 
subject that is both distinctly modernist and yet ontologically indefinite. I do not mean to 
argue that Woolf obliterates the stability of the individual self, but rather that she troubles 
it, querying—and queering—the dominant mode of self-fashioning. 
	   6	  
 I first define the archetype of the modernist “I,” the dominant mode of self-styling 
available to modernist subjects, by looking at a series of examples—including those from 
Woolf’s own nonfiction writing—of such a paradigm. I follow that discussion up by 
putting this definition into conversation with political and aesthetic manifestoes by 
Marinetti and Valentine de Saint-Point, which serve as instructive—if hyperbolic—
cultural touchstones for Woolf’s revision.  
The third section, Modernist History, defines Woolf’s revision of the paradigm 
laid out previously. In detailing my theorization of the subject-position that Orlando and 
Lily Briscoe share, I lay the theoretical substructure for the close readings of Woolf’s 
novels that follow. Much of this section is indebted to critical conceptions of subjectivity 
by Heather Love and G.M. Hyde, among others, but the lynchpin of the argument is in 
the differences between those critics and the models of self-styling that the second 
section attends to.  
 In my fourth section, Time Stretches: Accretions and Identity, I shift the focus of 
the paper to the literary texts at hand, spending the majority of the space attending to 
Orlando. The focus here on stretched temporality contrasts with the technique that the 
next section describes for To the Lighthouse. Brief treatments of “Modern Fiction” and A 
Room of One’s Own help to catalyze the dual function of this piece of my argument. In 
one sense, much of this section is spent finalizing a definition of backward subjectivity 
and building it into a working interpretive model, while in the other, that model is put to 
use in producing backward readings of the text. The section concludes by considering 
what ethical imperatives the use of backward subjectivity as a critical tool suggests. 
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 The fifth and final section of the paper treats To the Lighthouse with attention to 
the differences in temporal character between that text and Orlando. By contrasting the 
stretchiness of the latter’s temporal elasticity with the density of the former’s, I argue that 
the two different experiments with time ultimately produce the same theorization of 
subject. The paper concludes by reflecting once again on the ethical and methodological 
potential for a model of backward subjectivity, especially as it relates to theories of 
modernity and temporality. 
 
II. The Exclusionary Basis of Self-Styling or What Futurism Can Teach Us About the 
Rest of Modernism 
 An essential part of my argument has to do with one traditional concept of how 
the “I” works in modernism, a movement that Mina Loy called “a prophet crying in the 
wilderness that Humanity is wasting its time” (330). Loy’s modernist is a contrarian, a 
highly individualized subject for whom identity is inherently based on the notion of 
separation from the greater social body. The archetypical modernist statement is, like 
Loy’s aphorism, bold and individualistic, dependent on the idea of the modernist creator-
subject as not just unique, but prophetic. The dominant archetype of the high modernist 
sees himself (and they are largely “himselves”) at the cusp of some radical new moment. 
We can see this quite concisely in Pound’s famous formulation: “make it new.” Newness 
invokes not just innovation but an implicit dissatisfaction with the old. Pound’s A Pact 
describes this present-past antagonism with further clarity by figuring it as a function of 
his one-time distaste for Whitman, and is brief enough to be worth quoting in full: 
I make a pact with you, Walt Whitman— 
I have detested you long enough. 
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I come to you as a grown child 
Who has had a pig-headed father; 
I am old enough now to make friends. 
It was you that broke the new wood, 
Now is a time for carving. 
We have one sap and one root— 
Let there be commerce between us. 
While it is distinctly conciliatory, Pound’s sentiment is only charitable to a certain extent: 
The “commerce” that Pound envisions between himself and Whitman is, at best, fairly 
one-sided. Pound reserves the “carving” for himself, that is, he distinctly retains an 
authorial control that supersedes Whitman’s voice. Pound does gesture benevolently at 
the “one sap and one root” that the two poets share, but something about this burgeoning 
literary friendship does not sit quite right. The source of this is the conditional nature of 
Pound’s conciliation: even with this olive branch extended, the poem implies, Whitman’s 
writing is still only worth encountering provided that Pound mediates it for us. Pound, 
ever the “potent” editor—as he was with his “wholesale cuts” in The Waste Land—
cannot relinquish enough control to make a convincing case that the “commerce” with 
Whitman is too much more than lip service (Kelly). There is respect here—I do not wish 
to undermine the careful position this poem takes—but its general attitude toward literary 
predecessors adheres closely to the dominant paradigm of the modernist creator. Here, 
Pound styles himself as a herald of progress, a figure uniquely enabled by the historical 
moment of modernity to perform this particular mode of subjectivity. Such a model of 
individuality envisions a disjointed relationship to history; the idea of a break—with 
antiquated politics, with literary history, with aesthetic forms—informs this basic 
paradigm of modernist subjectivity.  
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Before beginning to describe the way in which Virginia Woolf refashions this 
paradigm, it is crucial to spend time examining a few moments in Woolf’s own writing 
that engage with this precise “make it new” styling. Not only do I wish to forge a 
definition complex enough to be useful to work with (and against), I also want to 
highlight the somewhat paradoxical and even counterintuitive nature of the argument I 
am making here.  
In A Room of One’s Own, Virginia Woolf’s optimism and hope for modernity, at 
least in contrast to the past, is palpable. For Woolf the opening decades of the twentieth 
century seem to spur her toward that archetypical modernist attitude hailing its singularity 
as a historical moment. Whereas “in the nineteenth century a woman wan not encouraged 
to be an artist” and furthermore, “she was snubbed, slapped, lectured and exhorted” if she 
even dared to try, the twentieth century is a time where even a woman author of average 
talent can succeed largely by virtue of “ha[ving] certain advantages which women of far 
greater gift lacked even half a century ago” (Room 61-2, 97). Physical and emotional 
violence, given a slight glossing-over by Woolf’s largely playful tone, is at the heart of 
what Woolf clearly rejects about not just the nineteenth century, but all of European 
history. At this point in the text, that is, Woolf is unequivocal: the twentieth century is a 
distinctly special time. Woolf frequently cites not just the titular room but the recent 
advantage of women’s right to vote, of the freedom for a woman to “go out alone,” to 
travel, to “drive through London in an omnibus or h[ave] luncheon in a shop by herself” 
(74-5). The sort of freedom opened up to women by such direct experience is crucial for 
the development of female authorship, which—as Woolf points out—makes Jane 
Austen’s brilliance without the advantages of modernity even more stunning. 
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 By no means is this lionization of modernity confined to A Room of One’s Own, 
either: it clearly informs her essays “Modern Fiction” and “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. 
Brown,” which use a similar exceptionalism to co-develop a distinction in fiction writing 
between the “materialists” and the “spiritualists,” the Edwardians and the Georgians, 
respectively. In these essays, modernity seems to very clearly force a confrontation 
between two varieties of writers, old and new: for the Georgians, “the tools of one 
generation are useless for the next…and so the smashing and crashing began” (“Mr. 
Bennett” 754-5). The “smashing” of Ulysses’ indecency and the “crashing” of BLAST are 
ostensibly the natural results of what Woolf draws up as a very simple diagram: 
modernism is predicated on a literary-historical encounter between two camps that 
necessitates the destruction of the old for the sake of the new.  
Perhaps nowhere is just such an attitude toward modernity more perfectly 
articulated than in Marinetti’s founding text of Futurism, the aptly named “The Founding 
and Manifesto of Futurism” as well as the collaborative Futurist poster, the “Futurist 
Synthesis of the War.” In discussing Woolf’s work and Futurist discourse in the same 
breath, I should again point out that I do not mean to imply that Woolf responds directly 
to—or ever even read—Marinetti. Even so, Futurism is an undeniable force in early 
twentieth century Europe: as Mary Ann Caws points out, the movement “made such a 
noise that it reverberated around Europe and became a legend even as it was still 
sounding” (169). So when Marinetti “traveled all over Europe” giving lectures about 
Futurism (ibid), he largely explained a binary scheme; the iconic poster “Futurist 
Synthesis of the War” describes it succinctly: “FUTURISM AGAINST PASSÉISM” 
(Marinetti et. al.). Centrally, under that main claim, the poster reads, “8 PEOPLE-POETS 
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AGAINST THEIR PEDANTIC CRITICS” (ibid). Various nations find their way into to the good 
graces of Marinetti’s scheme for their good qualities—“energy” and “elegance,” in one 
case, “sense of duty,” in another—but the visual implication of alliance is belied by the 
small text near the top of the poster. There, we find out that the “GENIUS” listed under 
Italy’s qualities licenses a unique aesthetic agency to only one of the so-called “people-
poets.” The text reads: “The Futuristic right to destroy works of art. This right belongs 
solely to the Italian creative Genius, capable of creating a new and greater beauty on the 
ruins of the old” (ibid). Although the imagery and language draws on reality in 
synthesizing the war, it also makes little pretension toward the idea of unification by 
setting Italy in a separate realm of agency from the other nations included. The cherry-
picked qualities referred to earlier reinforce this separation: the alliance is first predicated 
on the premise that the named nations perform the desired qualities listed next to their 
name and second, and more importantly, on the premise that the qualities listed near 
Germany and Austria are worse. There are two instances in the body of the poster of 
words that are printed larger than those directly above them: those two phrases are 
“GENIUS” and “CREATIVE GENIUS” (ibid). In privileging Italy as the poster does, it 
is important to notice the archetypical modernist stance that I have so far described. 
While there is a level of alliance diminishing the individuality of these voices shouting in 
the wilderness, the literal glorification of the “respect for individuality” that the poster 
values should not go unnoticed: we have here a mode of aesthetic and political self-
styling defined by oppositionality, especially to history. Germany and Austria, who take a 
beating in the piece, are criticized primarily for qualities such as “rigidity,” “brutality,” 
and a “constipation of industrial Camelots” (ibid). Ossification is what offends the 
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Futurists, that is, everything that is in any way stuck in the past. Even more than the 
dominant modernist stance, however, “Futurist Synthesis of the War” directs us to look at 
more than the basic oppositional element of that paradigm. Because the poster’s rhetoric 
is both political and aesthetic and its design is distinctly phallic, with the Futurists 
typographically penetrating the passéists, it none-too-subtly invites us to think about 
Futurism’s approach not just to gender politics but also to gendered aesthetics. 
Two texts speak even more directly to this gendered politics and aesthetics, which 
Mary Ann Caws calls Futurism’s identification of “the dynamic of the male vertical” 
against the “‘effeminate’ pastness” and its “supine” position (168). By examining these 
two texts—Marinetti’s founding manifesto and a response to it, the “Manifesto of 
Futurist Woman” by the French Futurist writer and artist Valentine de Saint-Point—the 
often-hyperbolic discourse of Futurism makes apparent a key secondary feature of what I 
have already described as the oppositional paradigm for modernist identity: namely, that 
it is a gendered one that can be, at times, violently exclusive. A lot of elements of 
Marinetti’s “Founding and Manifesto of Futurism” may be beginning to sound like 
boilerplate oppositional-paradigm discourse: there is the glorification of “aggressive 
action,” of “ardor” and “splendor” and “speed,” as well as the image of the Futurist 
standing “on the last promontory of the centuries” about to “break down the mysterious 
doors of the Impossible” (187). Marinetti’s oppositionality is intense, thorough, and 
systematic. Deeply invested in technology, the “splendor” and “speed” he revels in 
ultimately tie in to automobiles, about which he rhapsodizes breathlessly that “a racing 
car whose hood is adorned with great pipes, like serpents of explosive breath—a roaring 
car that seems to ride of grapeshot—is more beautiful than the Victory of Samothrace” 
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(ibid). The car, a snorting, flying hunk of metal, effortlessly outdoes what passed for 
beauty in the past; for Marinetti, exhaust pipes will always beat out wings, even those on 
the Victory of Samothrace. Not content enough to “glorify war,” Marinetti is quite careful 
indeed to take a contrarian stance on issues political, aesthetic, moral and academic. The 
common ground here, as the name of the movement implies, is a systematic rejection of 
everything that catalogues or memorializes the past: the scorn for the Winged Victory, 
the declaration that Futurists “will fight moralism,” and the now-classic impetus to 
“destroy” libraries and museums all share this common assumption (ibid). It can be easy 
to discount the ardor of such a text as immature or nearly parodic, even, but besides 
Marinetti’s lifelong dedication to Futurism, the unity of the stance suggests its 
seriousness. That is, Marinetti’s text is conscious of precisely what it proposes in 
severing itself from history: even if we suspect, he says, “that we are the revival and 
extension of our ancestors—perhaps!...If only it were so!—But who cares? We don’t 
want to understand!” (189). This informed rejection of the past makes its defiance even 
more significant. When we read item number nine in the manifesto, one of its most 
famous, we might now understand it as a clearheaded and willing conflation of 
systematic violence and misogyny: “we will glorify war—the world’s only hygiene—
militarism, patriotism, the destructive gesture of freedom-bringers, beautiful ideas worth 
dying for, and scorn for woman” (187). It is in that last addendum, nearly tacked-on as it 
is, syntactically, that we understand how sincere the Futurist bent for that 
male/virility/dynamism knot of terms is. “Scorn for woman” is as necessary as other 
tenets of literature and artistic blazon. While most wouldn’t put it the way Marinetti does, 
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glorifying war is not much new3, but the shock of it is its blatant disregard for women, 
who end up on the scrapheap with the rest of the regressive, turgid past.  
Three years later, in 1912, Valentine de Saint-Point publishes a bold response to 
Marinetti’s founding text, going so far as to use Marinetti’s contentious section number 
nine as an epigraph for her own piece. Saint-Point’s “Manifesto of Futurist Woman” 
proposes a model of womanhood around her primary assertion that “all humanity is 
mediocre” (213). For Saint-Point, Marinetti’s “scorn for women” is not a problem, but an 
opening premise to match her own: “heroes and geniuses” come from both sexes but 
those occurrences are rare. Instead, everyone “merit[s] the same scorn” (ibid). Saint-Point 
goes on to describe her vision of women’s role in modernity, namely that women, like 
men, lately suffer from a lack of virility. Still, her piece is important in its effort to carve 
out a space for women’s agency inside of Futurism, “even with all its exaggerations” 
(214). For Saint-Point, that agency is diametrically opposed to feminism—“we must not 
give woman any of the rights claimed by feminists” (215 emph. orig.)—and can only be 
accessed through reproductive sexuality. Motherhood “makes” men and so makes “power 
over them,” but only insofar as it is combined with a pronounced antisentimentalism 
(216). Saint-Point theorizes a useful version of the Futurist counter-stance that adapts to 
Marinetti’s scorn for women by spreading the blame for cultural and political malaise, 
asking women to become “sublimely injust,” to return “to violence, to cruelty” (215-6 
emph. orig.). Saint-Point’s manifesto offers us a vision of adapting the modernist 
paradigm, which we have seen is largely built to exclude women, to women’s desire to 
self-style. What we have, then, is essentially the same counter-stance as Marinetti’s, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Consider, e.g., Horace’s “dulce et decorum est pro patria mori” or any given piece of military portraiture.	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adapted to discourses of women’s rights at the turn of the century: Saint-Point rejects the 
entire premise of both political rights and social and household duties in favor of a 
manipulative model of agency, one that entirely glosses over the material difficulties of 
political disenfranchisement. While I do not want to eradicate the sense of radical 
possibility Saint-Point’s text presents—prefiguring radical movements that would not 
emerge for decades more—I do want to highlight the fact that even the “combative 
women” her text glorifies never give us a clear model for thinking beyond a role of 
subjection for the Futurist woman. The rhetorical similarities to the oppositional stance of 
Marinetti are more than just that: in the end, Saint-Point’s text still “scorns” as its mode 
of self-fashioning. 
 That spaces left in such texts for women to self-fashion through the dominant 
modernist paradigm are few. For Saint-Point, the role of the woman-as-creator is unclear, 
with agency only to be had mostly through an oppositional theorization of motherhood, 
while with Marinetti, women don’t even register beyond the level of scorn. What these 
Futurist writings let us see is that the dominant mode of self-styling, the modernist at 
odds with his past that Futurists take to the extreme, leaves little room for any other 
identificatory practice. Crucially, not all texts that partake in this aesthetically and 
historically oppositional paradigm are misogynist; such a formulation goes much too far. 
Rather, what I mean to do in examining such texts in detail is draw out something that is 
minimally implied in any oppositionalist ethic: that it necessarily functions on the 
exclusion of others.  
Furthermore, Futurist texts like those we have just examined also demonstrate that 
when considering the exclusionary dimension of a contrarian self-stylization, we would 
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do well to keep in mind the regularity with which women are precisely those excluded 
others on which such a practice hinges. This should cause us to look back at A Room of 
One’s Own, “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown” and “Modern Fiction” differently. 
Undeniably, Woolf has a special faith in the twentieth century as a moment in time that—
especially at the level of rights and material conditions—makes a real difference for 
women in the world. So in keeping with that, she does seem to embrace an element of 
this individualistic self-stylization. At the same time, given the way that exclusion seems 
to function in (at least some of) the texts that spontaneously generate such identifications; 
we have to register Woolf’s engagements with the dominant paradigm as fleeting. We 
talk of such identifications in moments in Woolf’s texts rather than in systems because, as 
Saint-Point’s manifesto demonstrates, adopting the oppositionalist paradigm as a 
woman—and retaining enfranchisement, rights, or creativity—is nearly impossible. The 
cultural current that we see at its most extreme in Futurism, like Charles Tansley, 
endlessly seems to mutter, “women can’t write, women can’t paint”—at least, not the 
way men do (TL 130). 
 
III. Modernist History: The Backward Subject 
With a firm understanding of the dominant paradigm I am referring to established 
along with the specific notion that its adoptability is contingent on gender, we can begin 
considering Woolf’s radical changes to that norm. The fact, that is, that Woolf revises 
this model of modernist subjectivity, taking it apart and reassembling creative self-
fashioning anew, makes much more sense now that we have established the limited 
availability of that subject-position. In this light, the formal and linguistic play in To the 
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Lighthouse and Orlando can be treated not as mere experimentation but a theorizing of 
selfhood that thinks beyond the violence proposed by oppositional stances like—but not 
limited to—Futurism. In that way, then, the theorization of selfhood that I want to 
describe below stands in stark contrast to the exclusionary stances we have seen so far. 
What we will find in Woolf is neither an uneasy pact with the past nor library-burning, 
but a model of self-fashioning that extends the subject into the past, articulating what 
Marinetti teases us with when he nearly admits to our being “the revival and extension of 
our ancestors” (Marinetti 189). For Woolf, though, that’s no joke. 
But is stark contrast the only side to this story? The short answer is no. As much 
as the model of backward subjectivity that I will describe opposes the exclusionary ideas 
above, there is a lingering debt to the brashness and individuality of the traditional 
paradigm. It is important not to lose sight of the power that a text like Saint-Point’s, for 
instance, generates. The reason that I see Woolf’s intervention as taking apart and 
reassembling rather than altogether obliterating the dominant paradigm is indeed because 
the counter-stance may be a mode of self-representation worth having. The other way to 
put this point is that this study does see Woolf as being at odds with many of her 
modernist contemporaries, at least in so far as she theorizes subjectivity, but I do not 
want to ignore the fact that Woolf was still a modernist, and one who saw power in the 
oppositional stances of her colleagues, at that. As I will describe this model of 
subjectivity, a definite sense of the counter-stance remains, but Woolf’s turn backward 
maintains a form of that individualist subject while working to mobilize a sense of 
modernist history in order to recover from a literary past marked by gendered exclusion. 
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In attempting to describe this model, it is perhaps best to begin by making a few 
theoretical borrowings. 
The bedrock for the model I want to articulate is Heather Love’s concept of queer 
history—or at least a version of it. From Love, I adopt the assertion that “the idea of 
modernity—with its suggestions of progress, rationality, and technological advance—is 
intimately bound up with backwardness” (5). For Love, “progress” and “regress” are not 
antitheses but inextricably intertwined because of modernity’s “reliance” on “excluded, 
denigrated or superseded others” (ibid). Supersession, in other words, is less about true 
progress than a convenient oppositional stance. Contrarian modes of self-fashioning are 
identifications that build themselves out of nothing but rejection; without women to 
scorn, then, perhaps Marinetti’s Futurism never quite gets off the ground. Of course, I am 
not literally interested in such speculations, but there’s an important point there: in 
Love’s view, those superseded others do not simply disappear, but remain spectrally even 
in what I have been calling the dominant paradigm. The vestigial trace of the other 
suggests that because exclusion only has meaning as a function of the identity of the 
excluded, even the individualist archetype is considerably less ontologically definite than 
it appears. 
Though this understanding of modernism’s relationship to its history is, as I have 
said, the bedrock for my theorization, I want to take it further than that. Love identifies a 
fundamental complication in the individualist paradigm, but I want to think beyond that 
paradigm altogether. If suppression is a form of identification, then what Woolf’s 
backward subject models is how big that small complication can get. When, earlier, I 
described my model of subjectivity as ontologically indefinite and yet distinctly 
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modernist, this is what I was hinting at: that the complication Love introduces about the 
individualist model can be exploded into a wholesale instability of the subject. In this 
view, then, we interested in a model of subjectivity that sees modernist history as an 
activation of the past into the lived present. This ancestral aspect of identity, the porous 
ontological relationship between the subject and its history, can take place either at the 
literal—as with an actual racial, national, or family ancestry—or at the literary level. 
When a backward subject is also a creator, as with Lily Briscoe and Orlando, selfhood 
hinges on a relationship between the creator-subject and his/her literary predecessors. 
In “The Poetry of the City,” G.M. Hyde delineates a model of modern literature’s 
interaction with metropolitan spaces. His central concern is the relationship of the “unreal 
city” of Eliot and other modernists4 to the identity of the writer, especially in poetry. 
While our concern is not with Hyde’s metropolis, we can still glean some theoretical 
material on subjectivity that compliments what we have already seen from Heather Love. 
Taken a certain way Hyde’s argument about the relationship between the modernist poet 
and the city suggest that identity is, perhaps, more contingent and less stable than we 
might expect. For Hyde, this means a specifically metropolitan contingency; in other 
words, the modernist poet’s voice is always invoking the dominant, individualistic mode 
of subjectivity, but in invoking the city, it is also mildly self-obliterating. The ever-
present figure of the city lets us know that the modernist poet is always speaking for 
“myself and my race, my race and its past” (339). There’s nothing new about the 
modernist subject generating identity through their works (i.e., “myself”), but Hyde’s 
claim that the poet’s voice is more rooted in history gives us a certain amount of pause in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Mostly Crane and Mayakovsky, in this case. 
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that old formulation. Hyde points us in a slightly different direction, prompting us to put 
some pressure on the question of “the individual talent’s relation to the literary tradition5” 
(ibid). This particularly literary construction of identity is also a surprisingly ancestral 
one: subjectivity in Hyde’s argument is not entirely obliterated, but neither is it 
ontologically definite. Instead, the poet speaks with a voice that constructs selfhood 
through constant identifications with ancillary bodies. Crucially, these identifications are 
not negative: the backward self is an affirmation of the ancestral, both in terms of literal 
“race”—one’s ethnic/family/national history—but also in the literary sense of the word, a 
voice and a subjectivity built by speaking as one in and of (not apart from) many. In 
Hyde’s claim, the word “myself” is still first, which is important to maintain: this is not a 
diagram in which the individuality of the subject is completely subsumed by a deference 
to literary or cultural history, but rather a model that tones down the hyperbolic 
oppositionality of, in this case, the poet’s voice. Hyde’s argument reminds us that an 
important element to recognize about backward subjectivity is that the revision of modern 
subjectivity it entails does not completely dispense with the dominant paradigm. Hyde 
also helps us begin to see what that instability, the rooting of the self so much outside the 
self (in literary history, in this case), looks like. 
 The title of this paper emphasizes temporality as integral to the scheme of 
selfhood and, so far, I have largely been silent on this point. The dominant mode of self-
fashioning, as I have framed it, does not ask many questions about temporality: the past 
has passed, especially for the Futurists. Futurism is an especially instructive example 
about this precisely because the entire movement assumes one important thing, namely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Hyde is, shockingly, not actually referring to the Eliot essay of almost that precise name, however. 
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that culture and aesthetics develop as time passes—and the corollary to that is that time is 
a linear, easily apprehensible concept. The backward subject troubles this scheme of 
temporality: by hinging on a radical re-conceptualization of time, backward subjectivity 
complicates what otherwise might not amount to much more than a collective shine for 
allusiveness.  
 A brief examination of critical studies of time’s relationship to modernist writing 
will help to adumbrate the temporal dimension of my argument. Michael Hollington’s 
essay “Svevo, Joyce and Modernist Time” helps our definition by providing a useful 
critical model regarding employments of time in the shift from realist to modernist 
fiction. Hollington identifies a particularly modernist progression away from nineteenth-
century ideas that “time is the medium in which people grow, individually and 
collectively” and that “events mark the critical points of” such a “change” (431). Tolstoy, 
Hollington frequently explains, provides a good model of this uncomplicated, linear 
conception of time: events are “logical descendant[s]” of each other and of characters’ 
coherent sensibilities; events obey “delicate laws of latent possibility” with respect to 
character (ibid). In other words, coherent and stable—even if not necessarily 
predictable—subjects experience life and develop according to a correspondingly 
coherent and stable sense of time. Bildungsromane are good examples of this: they end 
later than they begin and progress along that line toward a developmental endpoint that 
expresses the blooming of what was always latent in the character. In realist texts, we 
might say, endpoint is apotheosis. 
 Thinking briefly of modernist inversions and reconfigurations of 
bildungsromane—A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, The Metamorphosis, The 
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Picture of Dorian Gray6—it should not surprise us, then, that Hollington figures 
modernism (partially) as a reaction against this temporal stability. Hollington ascribes 
this reaction first to what he calls narrative “non-events7,” frustrations of both plot and 
our desires for “satisfactory” endings common in modernist texts (430-1). These 
interruptions are important because they are literary manifestations of the philosophical 
shift in understandings of temporality that Henri Bergson’s rejection of a linear 
conception of time caused. For the scope of this project we do not need to fully enter into 
the complexities of Bergsonian time; the rudiments of Bersgon’s intervention will do. 
One of the most basic of these interventions in thinking about time can be seen even in 
the language I just used: my use of the word “linear” necessarily operates within a spatio-
visual metaphor for time, that is, events somehow precede and follow each other as 
though existing independently. As a result, we imagine them as though we can see them 
in a clear progression, with events discretely separated yet causally related. As Hollington 
explains, Bergson exposed the fallacy of such discrete spatial representations of time, 
explaining events as “imaginary spatial points in the uninterruptible, indistinguishable 
flow of time” (431). The representation of time via spatial metaphors is not useless, then, 
but is only useful insofar as it is constantly kept in mind as a metaphor, one that interrupts 
and alters the immeasurable and elastic way time really works. The non-event, then, 
usefully signals an intellectual shift in thinking about temporality. Frustrated plotlines 
and anticlimaxes are literary symptoms of an endemic shift in understanding time. After 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For more about the Modern reconfiguration of the 19th century bildungsroman see Esty, Jed, “Virginia 
Woolf’s Colony.” Modernism and Colonialism. Eds. Begam, Richard and Michael Valdez Moses. Durham: 
Duke UP, 2007. 70-90. Print. 
7 On non-events, see Hollington 430. He gives as particularly instructive examples pretty much everything 
in Waiting for Godot and Stephen Dedalus’s not staying with Bloom at Eccles Street at the end of Ulysses.	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this shift, time is significantly less distinct, a change that deeply troubles causality. If 
nothing else, it is important to note that this makes both literary forms (like the 
bildungsroman) and subjectivity based on reactionary stances toward the past 
considerably more troubled. Hollington characterizes modernist technique as reactionary, 
and that idea largely seems to make sense, especially in terms of the dominant paradigm. 
What we can see in Hollington—that he himself would likely not suggest—is that the 
shift in temporality signals deeper shifts than solely those of literary technique. While we 
doubtlessly do see such patterns emerge, we also see more fundamental changes—those 
that change the very structure of selfhood—as we will later examine in both Orlando and 
To the Lighthouse.  
 
For Hollington, one of the core features of modernism as a result of an altered 
sense of temporality is “an ironic distrust of all absolutes, including those of temporal or 
spatial form” (432). Ambivalence, then, characterizes Hollington’s reading of Ulysses, 
which he argues against interpreting as a coherent, mythical narrative that stands outside 
of (or transcendent of) time. Instead, he argues that the myth-making project, too, is 
ambivalent. His reading, though flawed, is interesting enough to address in detail, only 
because the point on which he errs most helps explain the utility of backward subjectivity 
as a burgeoning theoretical tool. In retreading Hollington’s argument here, I mean to 
point out precisely how this model of subjectivity can prove theoretically useful, 
especially in the face of a text that presents such a complicated picture of time. While it is 
a somewhat secondary concern of mine, a brief examination of the Eumaeus chapter of 
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Ulysses ultimately gives us a fuller understanding of how to deploy backward subjectivity 
as a theoretical tool.  
Hollington describes the proliferation of coincidences and minutiae in Ulysses as 
a consciousness “of potential significance,” of the ways in which petty details are only a 
coincidence away from being loaded with significance (438). For Hollington, repetition 
loads details with mythical significance but also the potential for arbitrary—and even 
comic—triviality. The details themselves, regardless of whether or not they are repeated, 
beg to be catalogued and repeatedly pored over, even if it turns out that the reader is 
cross-referencing lists of bathhouses and butcher shops rather than Biblical passages and 
historical figures. This view is useful but reductive in some respects, especially 
considered in close relation to Ulysses. The interesting point that humorous language is 
frequent in Joyce is well made, but the conclusion that such language necessarily makes 
the confluence of detail ambivalent does not follow; humor does not undermine 
metaphorical language so simply. The language connecting Leopold Bloom to Charles 
Stuart Parnell that he describes in Eumaeus, for example, is not the 
“flims[y]…recurrence” Hollington claims, even where it is humorous; the glib dismissal 
of a “weary” parallel constructed of “supposed relationships” is not particularly attentive 
to the complexities of the chapter and moreover, isn’t critically useful (440). A reading of 
Eumaeus considering Leopold Bloom as a backward subject would understand his 
identity as imbued with, even contingent on the history that the language invokes 
seemingly at random. The reading, then, would give us would be an elaboration rather 
than a dismissal of the “inexactness” and humorousness of Bloom’s “mythic” analogues 
in “Odysseus, Christ, Parnell, Moses” and “Rip Van Winkle” (ibid). It is as if Hollington 
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gathered all of the right parts, but put them together all wrong; his attention to Bergson 
ought to prompt an explanation of how identification and time function coextensively in 
modern texts rather than a dismissal of the confluences that characterize that relationship. 
Backward subjectivity, that is, apprehends just such those linguistic confluences and 
allusions as constructive of the character they are attached to. Just as Hyde’s poet 
constructs himself ancestrally, so we can construct Bloom’s subjectivity as fundamentally 
part of those figures in an elastic temporality that allows Christ, Parnell and Odysseus to 
be present in Bloom in June 1904. As the language dips and dodges about such allusions, 
a reading that understands the subject in modernity going backward understands that the 
ontological instability inaugurated by Bergsonian philosophy and suggested by modernist 
literary experimentation carries even into how identity works. Experiments with time, 
that is, help to disturb and open up the limits of selfhood. 
 In his book The Consequences of Modernity, Anthony Giddens offers an account 
of the conditions under which modernism comes into existence. While broadly 
contrasting with our account of modernist temporality, Giddens’s text does offer some 
useful points in common with the goal of this paper. While Giddens theorizes a 
relationship between literary dynamism and the reification of time, I am interested in the 
inverse question: what emerges when time becomes elastic? As Jessica Berman points 
usefully points out in summarizing his text, Giddens “hinges his theory of modernity on 
the disjuncture of time and space” (Berman 285). For Giddens, premodernity is 
characterized by an intimate relationship between “when” and “where,” so that time was 
calculated (such as with a calendar or even mechanically with a clock) but not uniform 
across “social organization[s] of time” (Giddens 17-8). Giddens identifies international 
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modes of dating—i.e., sharing a year across cultures, even those non-Christian or not 
even culturally synchronized with the Gregorian Calendar—as evidence of a social 
reification of time, one that produces an independent concept that allows (eventually) for 
“the extreme dynamism of modernity” (20). The reification and social normalization of 
time Giddens describes forces the past into the past, disallowing it from being 
constitutive of a modern subject. Giddens does not unmake the past, but he does bring us 
back to a linear model of time that enables oppositionalism more than it does porousness. 
Giddens essentially proposes a theory of temporality and modernism that works 
excellently with the dominant paradigm of modernist subjectivity. By doing so, he 
describes a theory of time that allows the oppositional subject to experience the past as 
having passed. This conceptualization of the connection between time and subject is 
important to the informing critical assumptions that this project fundamentally makes: 
even though Giddens approaches it from a different angle, he still emphasizes the strong 
link between identity and temporality. Giddens gives us a critical account of how 
temporality interacts with the oppositional paradigm: reified time results in a worldview 
in which the past can be experienced as—to paint with broad strokes—ossified and 
irrelevant. What focusing on temporality gives us, then, is a connection between literary 
technique and conceptions of subjectivity. Even Giddens points this out: modernist 
experimentation only emerges under a certain conditions, and a reified sense of 
temporality is a key one of those.  
If Giddens directs us, then, toward a temporal understanding of the archetypical 
subject-position in modernity, I mean to propose a different understanding of temporality 
that supports the revision of identity that the backward subject inaugurates. What 
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supports any understanding of backward subjectivity, that is, is a sense of temporal 
elasticity, informed—at least indirectly—by Bergson’s shift away from the spatio-linear 
metaphor for time. Elastic temporality, as we see in both the stretched timeline of 
Orlando and the collapsing of time in To the Lighthouse, produces an elastic self. 
 
IV: Time Stretches: Accretions and Identity 
Moving away, now, from the definitional project of this piece, we turn first to 
Orlando and, briefly, to Woolf’s nonfiction and later to To the Lighthouse as catalysts for 
eliciting a working model of the concept. In so doing, I hope to further complicate my 
working definition of the backward subject. In this section, I frequently give readings of 
Orlando that include parallels to A Room of One’s Own in order to draw our attention to 
yet another characteristic of the model of subjectivity this paper examines, the specific 
instance of backward subjectivity we see in creator-characters. By attending to Woolf’s 
nonfiction in this section in addition to the novel, my argument highlights the importance 
of the gendered literary history in which Woolf sets the backward subject.  
 By way of counterpoint to an argument that I roughly made above, I want to begin 
this section by returning to Woolf’s essay “Modern Fiction,” which I earlier argued gives 
us a glimpse of the oppositional subject. By rereading it now, we can get a sense for the 
complexity of the revision that Woolf proposes in constructing subjectivity differently. 
However, the text presents a difficulty even from the very beginning: Woolf toys with the 
temptation of a wholesale rejection of all preceding literature. “It is difficult,” she points 
out, “not to take it for granted that the modern practice of the art [of fiction] is somehow 
an improvement upon the old” (739). That toying is about more than her qualified 
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phrasing: everything about Woolf’s tone here is notoriously difficult to pin down. 
Through her other texts8 we know well her reverence for Austen, so it seems safe to take 
the premise that the old “masterpieces certainly have a strange air of simplicity” at least 
somewhat in jest (ibid). Ultimately, she admits that her “quarrel, then, is not with the 
classics,” leaving us with a few different rhetorical registers to sort out (ibid). The tonal 
progression from flippantly bold to the cool admission of the influence of the classics 
largely fits the oppositionalist archetype: the out-of-the-gate rhetoric—even in joking—
does not quite match up with the more considered, measured assessment of things, 
especially where revered “classics” are involved.  
Indeed, the entirety of Woolf’s quarrel in the very short essay is with her 
contemporaries and immediate Victorian (or Edwardian) predecessors. What Woolf 
ultimately primarily advocates for is not, however, a foreclosure of anything. She 
simultaneously breaks with the oppositional archetype and conforms to it when she 
argues for an aesthetic opening up, leaving us with a new, revised position for the 
creator-subject. Although we can see conformity in her exhaustion with and opposition to 
the writing that immediately precedes and surrounds her, her resultant aesthetic 
conclusion is amorphous and broadly permissive: “everything is the proper stuff of 
fiction, every feeling, every thought” (742, 744). Woolf refuses to foreclose any aesthetic 
avenue, a breadth that crucially characterizes the backward subject. Of course, Woolf is 
arguing here about aesthetics in fiction, but the language is distinctly cast as human: 
“feeling,” “thought,” “brain and spirit” make up the “stuff of fiction,” so that soul and 
aesthetics are actually quite closely tied together, hence the spiritualist epithet for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See A Room, p. 74 
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most admirable authors. What I am arguing about “Modern Fiction,” goes a little further, 
though: what Woolf sees as an aesthetic choice, I cannot help but see (especially because 
of the link between aesthetics and sensual perception) as a description of a process of 
identity-building. Good fiction, in this light, comes from a broad conflation and co-
implication of self with the outside world. To return to G.M. Hyde’s description of the 
poet’s voice, Woolf’s ideal fictive voice not only speaks as “myself and my race, my race 
and its past,” but beyond that to include the sensory dimension of such a diversity of the 
self (Hyde 339). The force of felt experience draws what would otherwise be outside the 
self into the realm of thought and feeling that characterizes spiritualist fiction, an 
amorphousness of subjective limits that blurs the ontological boundaries of the self. 
It’s important to point out that Woolf’s argument does not seek to make anything 
new out of whole cloth, which is the aspect of revision that her approach to subjectivity 
entails. Instead, she wants to “break” and “bully” the existing model of fiction, “as well 
as honor and love her” (“Modern Fiction” 744, emphasis mine). The similarity to 
Donne’s Holy Sonnet XIV is telling: it is as if even in seeking to remake fiction, Woolf 
can’t escape the draw of literary history. In “Modern Fiction,” there is from one angle the 
urge to be rid of the influence that once asked God to “break, blow, burn, and make me 
new,” and from another, the veneration of it as classic. The key difference, though, is that 
Woolf is anything but passive: rather than waiting around for divine intervention to repair 
her faith, Woolf rushes in headfirst to aid her ailing numen. 
 
By way of beginning with Orlando, I would like to describe two (generally) 
separate general senses of reading the book, both of which are important to keep in mind; 
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used with each other, they can produce slippages and interesting problems. Both senses 
orbit around an attempt to understand the fantastic elements of the text, particularly as the 
plot draws to a close. Essentially, the interpretive question is about whether to accept the 
change in Orlando’s sex and her/his long life as a simple—and therefore fantastic—fact. 
The majority of the text gives us no reason to doubt this: young man Orlando changes to 
young woman Orlando directly and with notable understatement. As we near the end of 
the text, though, we find plenty of signals that imply an allegorical reading: life span 
becomes a slippery proposition rather than a fact, there are some people “we know to be 
dead, though they walk among us” and some “not yet born” and some like Orlando 
“hundreds of years old though they call themselves thirty-six” (Orlando 305). “Nothing 
more quickly disorders” the span of someone’s life, we are reminded, “than contact with 
any of the arts,” so that quite suddenly we are forced to at least entertain the possibility 
that the entire text preceding is a long conceit for a life lived in literature (306). The latter 
is well-supported by the text’s subtitle “A Biography” as well as the dedication and 
pictures throughout of Vita Sackville-West: if we go along with a biographical reading, 
we must look at Vita/Orlando as long-lived and sex-changed through her aristocratic 
ancestry and her “contact with the arts.” Both readings are useful but it is difficult to deny 
the force of the Vita-informed reading that figures the text as an obvious allegory for 
reading—or at least for cultural experience—and that particular reading also best 
contributes to a model of backward subjectivity.  
 In reading Orlando as largely metaphorical, there is a palpable sense of weight. 
Experiences in the present bear the weight of history through common imagery. As 
Orlando walks around a store in 1928, she’s burdened by images from her past, musing 
	   31	  
that “nothing is any longer one thing. I take up a handbag and I think of an old bumboat 
woman frozen in the ice” from three hundred years ago (305). Her perceptual experience 
of life becomes, by the twentieth century, one built up from accretions: associations, 
memories, and images that haunt her to the point of tears, a haunting we can imagine both 
as a literal too-long life and also as the pain of being wrapped up in books. In the passage 
I quote from above, people’s lives are quantified in years as a figure of the degree to 
which they truly live, and the immediate corollary of “contact with any of the arts” is 
instructive: the combined ideas of life span and quality are loaded with a very certain set 
of values, a literary and artistic history that can make you the walking dead, ten times 
your own age, or—for some—“precisely the sixty-eight or seventy-two years allotted 
them on the tombstone” (ibid). This is a powerful realization about the way that the text 
sees modern subject always speaking as more-than-one9 and Orlando reveals the 
unpleasant edge that may have. Being an accretion of literary and personal history can be 
deeply painful, while not having any of those accretions can be profoundly emptying. 
The sadness that Orlando suggests is tricky, because we are clearly meant to understand 
it as somehow better, at least, than the uncultured lives of the walking dead but there is 
still not necessarily anything to be happy about in such a construction.  
The seriousness of whatever sadness is in the text is difficult to gauge: Orlando’s 
tears and revelry about “Persian mountains” cause her to “lose her shopping list and start 
home without the sardines, the bath salts or the boots”—no great disaster, for sure (305-
6). At the same time, though, her return to her ancestral home is met with feelings of 
ambivalence. Her house, “no longer hers entirely,” feels alien, “belong[s] to time now; to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Again, “myself and my race, my race and its past” (Hyde 339). 
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history” and is populated with locked glass cases and “printed notices” asking visitors not 
to touch things (318). Even so, we find out that “she, who believed in no immortality, 
could not help feeling that her soul would come and go forever with the reds on the 
panels and the greens on the sofa” (317). While she may not believe in any immortality, 
its presence is palpable. If a handbag in a London store touches off a painful memory, we 
are only left to imagine the similarly burdensome more-than-objects that pile up in home 
like that, invoking a peculiar but definite sense of some sort of immortality. Orlando’s 
return to her ancestral home is marked with alienation, but also with what I can only read 
as reverence and contentment. The “panels” and “sofa” themselves do not seem 
significant; indeed, none of the many fine objets d’art locked away behind glass seem to 
be objects of reverence. Instead, the tones and hues of the home, its broadest strokes 
rather than its seemingly most valuable contents, conjure an apparent satisfaction that, as 
both the temporal implication of “immortality” and the mention of the “soul” suggest, is 
ancestral in nature. Orlando’s experience of the house is enabled by the combination of a 
sense of elastic temporality and an identificatory link between the emotional, internal 
“soul” and the relatively mundane hues of the home. Her homecoming is backward by 
virtue of the breakdown of the ontological limits of self that a dynamic understanding of 
time licenses. 
Examining the backward subject in Orlando gives us, then, an odd mix of comfort 
and alienation, an ambivalence that reminds us that the modern subject that speaks as 
more-than-“I,” constructed by an intimacy between an individualist self and a collective 
(especially literary) history, might very well be one constructed by a painful history. 
Contextualizing the backward subject in terms of pain helps us to understand Woolf’s 
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revision of the dominant oppositionalist paradigm of subjectivity: pain guides us away 
from conceptualizing a relationship to the past as either acceptance or rejection. What we 
have instead is an encompassing bond that contains both the icy, museum feel of 
alienation and the warmth—the red panels and green sofas, as it were—of comfort and 
connection. Backward subjectivity navigates the acceptance/rejection binary by 
acknowledging the necessary involvement of pain in identity formation. By 
acknowledging pain and exclusion, Woolf’s revised subjectivity gets to have it both 
ways, but not without cost: she can take advantage of the unique historical moment that 
modernity presents in order to stand against the injustices of an exclusionary past while 
integrating with what’s valuable in that past. The cost is, as I discuss later, that pain is 
also integrated. Regardless, this coimplication runs so deep, in fact, that (as we see in 
Orlando) there is no differentiation between literal personal history and an encounter 
through reading: throughout the text they are one and the same. 
The ancestry throughout Orlando is primarily notable because it appears to be the 
privilege of the wealthy, which is of course complicated by the fact that so much of the 
text is based on Woolf’s friend and sometimes-lover Vita Sackville-West10. Knole, the 
house Vita grew up in, formed the basis for the massive estate in the text, and even 
though Woolf “would always associate Vita with her house and ancestry,” which was “as 
much the inspiration for Orlando as Vita was herself” (Lee 481), that association was not 
necessarily always a positive one. For Woolf, Knole was a little troubling, as she herself 
once wrote: “There is Knole, capable of housing all the desperate poor of Judd Street, & 
with only that one solitary earl in the kernel” (qtd. in Lee 490). The image is recognizable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 q.v. Lee, Virginia Woolf. 
	   34	  
from the text: Orlando is frequently alone in his/her estate, and it naturally invokes the 
passage earlier about her alienation upon returning in 1928. Woolf is doubtlessly, then, 
skewering the aristocratic privilege of Orlando/Vita, so it is tempting to look at Orlando 
as a satirical figure. As a young man, his melodramatic writing is too aristocratic to be 
any good, which we see in another skewering, Nick Green’s cruel mockery of his drama 
“the Death of Hercules,” which is “wordy and bombastic in the extreme” (95). I include 
these examples to point out that Woolf is not just making harmless jokes here and there, 
but is at least fairly committed to a satire of the upper classes. What makes these 
complications useful for thinking about a concept of ancestral subjectivity is that the text 
as a whole seems to operate largely on an ancestral formation of the main character, an 
operation that is not actually interrupted by the introduction of complicating factors like 
satire. Orlando certainly remains sympathetic, and even when the text incorporates pain 
into the burden carried by Orlando, it clearly values the sort of life Orlando has lived (i.e., 
a life of reading and the arts), even if only at the basest value of being not the kind of 
person who is dead even though he is walking among us. 
We find a similar pattern in the way that the text is gendered, with the literary 
history through the entire text up until 1928 unequivocally gendered male. The lists of 
authors that Orlando admires as a young man—“Shakespeare, Marlowe, Ben Jonson, 
Browne, Donne”—and even the Swift, Pope and Addison she (barely) tolerates as a 
woman in the eighteenth century both reflect a distinct maleness (88). The literary canon 
necessarily involves a privileging of men-as-authors that jarringly affects her acceptance 
by the time she becomes a woman, something we see especially well in her naïveté about 
her place among the wits:  
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A woman knows very well that, though a wit sends her poems, praises her 
judgment, solicits her criticism, and drinks her tea, this by no means 
signifies that he respects her opinions, admires her understanding, or will 
refuse, though the rapier is denied him, to run her through the body with 
his pen. (214)  
While a woman does know all that very well, Orlando is not a regular woman, and by 
virtue of her former state, the sting of betrayal is even harsher. The text highlights a 
particularly literary sense of women’s subjugation in moments like this, and points 
implicitly to the twenties as an especially unique historical moment in removing that 
subjugation. And indeed, as Orlando comes into the present of the text, October 1928, we 
see Woolf’s familiar idea bubble up that “there was something definite and distinct about 
the age…a distraction, a desperation” (298), and in that privileging we certainly see an 
element of conventional modernism. Even if the age is desperate, it’s special; this sort of 
historical exceptionalism is conventional and it is doubtlessly a force throughout 
Orlando: the gendered literary history that operates throughout the text is broken down 
somewhat by the 1920s, a time when Orlando can drive about wildly in a car and the 
narrator can sense something special going on in the twentieth century. Perhaps the best 
textual illustration of this is the way that Orlando re-encounters Nick Greene in the 
nineteenth century and the way that the “The Oak Tree” changes. After being printed and 
mildly praised by the hypocritical critic, Orlando awakens into the twentieth century to 
“fame! Seven editions. A Prize. Photographs in the evening papers,” praise she is 
suddenly able to receive for her old poem and her winning of “The Burdett Coutts 
Memorial Prize” (312). Offstage, her poem changes from the hidden thoughts of a 
bombastic boy to a curiosity, and eventually only in the 1920s is it possible for her to 
reach fame as a result of it. This progression illustrates exactly why the twentieth century 
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merits historical exceptionalism in the text: it finally reveals some fissures in the male 
dominion of literary history.  
 What complicates a conventional reading that gives full weight to that historical 
exceptionalism, though, is the provenance of the poem itself. It originally comes from 
Orlando the young man, and even though he was clearly not part of the literary canon in 
his time, he still involved himself with writers, specifically by supporting them 
financially. The poem, the one piece of literature Orlando retains over the years, changes 
with time and so in both remaining and metamorphosing is also analogous to Orlando 
him/herself: it is a relic built by accretions over the course of centuries, it is inseparably 
“both-and,” both new and old, both feminine and masculine, both remaining and altered. 
Orlando’s final return home and her last interactions with the poem bear out an 
interesting alternative, one that helps to illustrate what sort of space backward 
subjectivity works in. When a copy of “The Oak Tree” comes out of her pocket right 
under the tree that inspired the poem, Orlando at first intends to bury it with an 
admittedly “silly” eulogy (324). Instead, she reflects that the fame, the prize and money it 
has earned her are all irrelevant: “What has praise and fame to do with poetry? What has 
seven editions (the book had already gone into no less) got to do with the value of it? 
Was not poetry a secret transaction, a voice answering a voice?” (325). As much as the 
twentieth century is uniquely able to smash the dominance that harmed Orlando’s life 
earlier in the text, its arrival is not the end of the story, as it were. Indeed, the twentieth 
century seems to be “as ill suited as could be to” poetry (ibid). Far from trusting the 
moments in which the text orients us toward its present as exceptional, we must 
understand even the embrace of the dawning of the 1900s as ambivalent. The same 
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pragmatic technological and cultural developments that allow women into the realm of 
literary history—newspapers, the critical review press, industrial printing—are also 
dangerous to the essence of poetry as a whole. The good-with-bad pairing should be 
familiar by now; it is the same version of history that builds Orlando through accretions 
of loss (loves lost, betrayals) as well as of gain (Shelmerdine & her son). In that case, a 
critical conversation between Orlando and backward subjectivity gives us not just the 
basic revision of the individualist modernist, but the stipulation that that revision 
necessarily involves absorbing into the self not just a history of which one is proud, but 
also one that causes pain. Destabilizing the ontological limits of self, that is, is not code 
for cherry-picking an identity that is free of injustice or pain. Quite the contrary: 
backward subjectivity asks of us a porousness of identity that commits to embracing 
responsibility for an exclusionary and frequently unjust past. So, when Orlando speaks 
from the vantage-point of modernity, not only is she speaking as a self built up of 
accretions from Elizabethan, eighteenth century, Victorian and modern literature and 
history, but specifically as a self always built up from both the value and the pain in a 
gendered literary history. Instead of allowing us to dispense with the past when it gets 
painful, Woolf asks us to do the difficult job of existing in and with the world we have, 
standing against injustice when appropriate but also understanding that an individual-only 
approach is never going to be anything more than the oppositionalist “crying in the 
wilderness” (Loy 330). Backward subjectivity, it seems, carries with it an ethical drive: to 
whatever degree the ontological instability it initiates might be considered self-
obliterating, but it asks us to attend to what Heather Love calls the “excluded, denigrated 
or superseded others” that progress inevitably depends on (5). In so doing, Woolf’s 
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revision of modernist subjectivity proposes self-fashioning that maintains the avant-
gardist edge, but does not need to denigrate, exclude or supersede others because it makes 
no pretention to progress. The backward subject operates in a highly elastic 
understanding of time—as we have seen in Orlando—in order to use the real advantages 
of modernity to redress the injustices of a collective history built on denigration and 
exclusion. 
 
V: Time Collapses 
 In order to bring about a conclusion, I feel the need to go—where else?—
backwards. As she struggles to bring her painting to completion, Lily Briscoe observes 
that “so much depends, then…upon distance,” and of course, in her painting and 
throughout this project, that holds true (TL 284). The kind of distance that matters in To 
the Lighthouse, though, is different from that in Orlando. In the latter, we looked at 
accretions over the course of a fantastically long life that form a backward subject; 
distance is a figure for a breadth of experience that is drawn into the self as identification. 
In To the Lighthouse, however, distances are shorter: the scale is human, rather than 
epochal, and scale is not the only difference. Distance, particularly in time rather than in 
space, is significant throughout To the Lighthouse because it is compressed rather than 
stretched to its limits; despite the fact that the two texts are informed by different 
temporal experiments, they are both invested in a reimagining of subjectivity primarily 
through those two different approaches to time. In this section, I want to examine some 
manifestations of the temporal compression that characterizes To the Lighthouse, first in 
some generalized and stylistic examples, and then in Lily’s progress through her painting. 
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 As a foundation for this final section, I would first like to attend to the elasticity 
of time that characterizes the text. Whereas in Orlando the unconventional treatment of 
temporality seems relatively obvious, it is not quite so in To the Lighthouse. Of course, 
the second section of the book, “Time Passes,” signals to readers that something is going 
on, but what that is might not be self-evidently clear, so it seems necessary to lay out 
some of the temporal underpinnings of the argument that this section makes. To the 
Lighthouse takes place over the course of two days that are roughly a decade apart. That 
decade, the void in the text when “time passes,” includes the Great War and the deaths of 
Mrs. Ramsay, as well as Andrew and Prue Ramsay. Although the technique in “Time 
Passes” is different than what we see in Orlando, the result is much the same: we only 
need to think back to Giddens and his reified time to realize precisely how intense the 
departure from a normative temporality is here. Night falls as the section starts and 
darkness appears to spread as usual throughout a house, except that it suddenly 
accelerates, and the blackness becomes a void-like motif as “night, however, succeeds to 
night” and the scale of time passing shifts from diurnal to seasonal: “night after night, 
summer and winter, the torment of storms, the arrow-like stillness of fine weather, held 
their court without interference” (202). Time is unstoppable here, but not exactly reified: 
it gains and loses speed, proceeds indifferently to the human and structural entropy that 
its passage necessitates. Rather than seeing that standard, mathematical time that Giddens 
associates with modernity, in the dialectical construction between bracketed human scale 
tragedies and triumphs—Mr. Carmichael’s poetry has “an unexpected success” because 
of the war (202); Mrs. Ramsay dies “rather suddenly” and without any drama (194)—and 
in the seasonal or annual scale of time’s motion and the house we can observe an 
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excellent instance of the temporal elasticity inaugurated by Bergson. Describing the 
dialectical construction of main- and bracketed-text as parallel timelines doesn’t at all do 
justice to the lack of causality or even correspondence between the two. Rather, the 
events in “Time Passes” are scattered in the void, sequenced but not connected, sped up 
but unevenly so. The style that characterizes the rest of To the Lighthouse—on which 
more later—disappears entirely, compressing the text into a murky and quickly-moving 
present. Still, what emerges is a sense of time as drastically subjective: the house hurdles 
through time at a breakneck pace, dogged by decay, only when unoccupied. Which is to 
say that To the Lighthouse flatly rejects the premise of reified time; for this text, time 
does not pass the same in all places, but passes differently based on the presence of a 
subject to interact with its passage. Time and the subject, in this sense, are consubstantial: 
the two mutually constitute each other, which sets us up with a vastly subjective 
temporality and, even more importantly, a widely capacious subjectivity.  
 This link between temporal experimentation in the formal characteristics of the 
text and the theorization of subject persists even into the prose style of the rest of the text. 
If “Time Passes” shows us a hyper-compressed and sped-up sense of time, the rest of the 
text retains background levels of the same informing idea. The majority of To the 
Lighthouse has a slightly compressed style: distinctions between past and present, 
memory, speech, and wandering thoughts are all glossed over. All of these disparate 
elements, that is, are brought into a textual present. As Mrs. Ramsay reads to James, for 
instance, she slips after a moment into “reading and thinking, quite easily, both at the 
same time” (87). While plot-level action continues, then, with Mrs. Ramsay reading, we 
launch into meditations on Minta, memories and hopes for her children, her anxieties, all 
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in a jumbled constant sequence: “was she not forgetting how strongly she influenced 
people? Marriage needed—oh, all sorts of qualities (the bill for the greenhouse would be 
fifty pounds); one—she need not name it—that was essential” (93). Concerns about her 
pressure on Minta here mix with the quotidian financial concern and abstract thoughts 
about the nature of companionship in a compressed form. We can experience this textual 
present as a moment that flattens out the distinctions between memory, abstraction and 
passing concern: everything is pressed into the forefront. This compression, while 
slightly different than that in “Time Passes,” is analogous to the backward subject in that 
it destabilizes the limits of what qualifies as present. The textual form performs a 
compression of memory with action that is congruous to the backward subject’s 
porousness of identity and ancestry. The passage quoted above obviously demonstrates 
how memory works in the classic modernist stream-of-consciousness style, but my 
reading pushes further than that. Analyzing such a passage in terms of backward 
subjectivity allows us to consider the flashes of memory and anxiety we see here as more 
important than we might normally. Instead of discounting any one flash as a momentary 
concern, To the Lighthouse and indeed the backward model of subjectivity both demand 
of us intense inclusivity. Just as the text is broadly inclusive, pulling action, thought, 
memory, anxiety and hope into the present, so is the model of subjectivity that we can see 
in this text: there is a consistency of inclusion, of understanding the breadth of subjective 
experience as integral to defining the self.  
 Perhaps this is best drawn out by looking now at Lily Briscoe, our central 
character who, much like Orlando, struggles with artistic production while navigating the 
relationship between identity and temporality. For Lily, the ancestry in identity is even 
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more apparent than it is for Orlando. Lily’s situation at the cusp of a breakdown in an 
exclusionary literary history penetrates her sense of self. Across the void of time passing, 
Lily brings to the Isle of Skye a dense subjectivity that bears history with it. 
 Lily’s art itself adds further depth to this characterization. In reference to her 
painting, she tells William Bankes that she “had made no attempt at likeness”; the purple 
triangular shape that signifies Mrs. Ramsay reading to James is “not of them”—not in the 
sense of a mimetic representation, that is (81). It is also abundantly clear that Lily is used 
to answering such questions: “she knew” the “objection” that “no one could tell it for a 
human shape” before he has a chance to raise it (ibid). We get the sense that Lily Briscoe 
is more than used to being harangued for her artistic technique; her answers are patient 
and polite and she does her best to express the mechanical and compositional decisions 
that such shapes reflect: 
a mother and child might be reduced to a shadow without irreverence. A 
light here required a shadow there. …It was a question, she remembered, 
how to connect this mass on the right hand with that on the left…She 
stopped; she did not want to bore him; she took the canvas lightly off the 
easel. (81-3) 
Lily’s description of her art reveals a sensibility both experimental and accommodating: 
without ever wavering about the merits of her representational strategies or her skill as a 
painter, she takes an accommodating approach to explaining the lack of mimesis on her 
canvas. She reduces shapes not because she has the right as a Creative Genius (as the 
Futurists would put it) but because it is necessary in the balance of object and color and 
also because it can be done “without irreverence.” Lily’s painting is distinctly that of 
modernity: she eschews the representational practice that Bankes admits is his 
“prejudic[e],” but she also maintains the goal of “reverenc[ing]” her subjects (81-2). For 
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Lily, that reverence can be done in a different register, a “tribute” that takes a form other 
that, seen in one way, distinctly opposes its immediate artistic predecessors. Her painting 
participates in the exceptional moment of modernity by experimenting formally while 
also avoiding the arbitrary artistic fiat that characterizes many such experiments: Lily’s 
work is both radical and thoughtful—individualistic and yet reverent, which is to say, not 
at all exclusionary. 
 We might surmise that Lily’s art, then, performs her backward subjectivity—and 
with good cause. After revealing the unfinished painting to Bankes, Lily recognizes 
gravity in that aesthetic exchange: “but it had been seen; it had been taken from her. This 
man had shared with her something profound and intimate” (83). Art, that is, is a vehicle 
for intimacy. Lily’s art bears the analytical weight of reading it as identity precisely 
because the act of allowing it to be seen pushes her further than she had expected it 
would into the realm of intimacy. Through the interface of her art, Lily enters a distinctly 
inclusive world, fueled by  
a power which she had not suspected—that one could walk away down the 
long gallery not alone any more but arm in arm with somebody—the 
strangest feeling in the world and the most exhilarating (83) 
Leaving aside the aesthetics of the piece itself for a moment, the human engagement of 
seeing and talking about her canvas provides Lily with a euphoric feeling of intimacy. 
The intimate act of sharing scares her, something is “taken from her,” but something is 
also gained, the “exhilarat[ion]” of human connection surprises Lily. Artistic creation, in 
other words, offers the perfect space for backward subjectivity to operate: its practice of 
identification is both intimate and individualistic. Lily, working through her struggles 
with the piece, experiences “a power” in the world “which she had not suspected”: a 
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pleasurable disturbance of the boundaries of self. Her euphoric walk down that gallery, 
that is, is an experience of intimacy in that it demonstrates the exhilarating vulnerability 
of exposure: by expanding the limits of the self, testing this backward subjectivity, Lily 
exposes herself to a world that might take from her, but also experiences the “strangest 
feeling in the world,” the intimacy that such a destabilization of identity necessitates. As 
we saw in Orlando, the backward subject risks and includes a certain level of pain: it is 
not a model that denies the vulnerability it implies, and for Lily that pain is first the 
exhilaration of exposure, and second that of the gendered world of cultural production. 
 I titled this section “Time Collapses” because in To the Lighthouse, time seems to 
fold inward rather than stretching outward. The two days that make up the majority of the 
book are, in many ways, quite similar, except of course for the titular trip to the 
lighthouse. Despite all that happens in “Time Passes,” Lily is still stuck with the same 
compositional problem in her painting in the final section as she is in the first. And, 
crucially, despite the fact that now she is alone watching a much-smaller Ramsay family 
in the distance, she never seems it. I say that “time collapses” in To the Lighthouse 
because everyone who is “distant”—either dead or literally far-off—seems to be carried 
into the perpetual present of Lily’s struggle to paint. Mrs. Ramsay, whose death weighs 
heavily on Lily, is one such figure. While thinking about her death, Lily audibly cries out 
her name, giving voice to her “pain” and “tears,” and eventually, as that emotion begins 
to ebb, she notices, “mysteriously,”  
a sense of some one there, of Mrs. Ramsay, relieved for a moment of the 
weight that the world has put on her, staying lightly by her side and then 
(for this was Mrs. Ramsay in all her beauty) raising to her forehead a 
wreath of white flowers with which she went. Lily squeezed her tubes 
again. She attacked that problem of the hedge. (269) 
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The vision Lily has is “strange” in its clarity, it “console[s]” her, we find out as it 
develops (269-70). Mrs. Ramsay, in a very real textual way, is not at all gone, is—to us 
as readers, especially—just as real as ever: a passing image. The language in which it is 
cast is important, too: the sense is “of some one there”: Lily is not simply recalling Mrs. 
Ramsay in a moment of pleasurable recollection, there is a palpability about this moment 
that matters. Lily’s vision also does not seem to be a memory of Mrs. Ramsay in that the 
features of the vision, her ethereality and the white flowers, suggest something of the 
heavenly rather than anything from the first section of the text. Significantly, Lily is 
immediately inspired to return to her work in the painting. Not only is this significant 
because the painting includes Mrs. Ramsay—whose image she may well be trying to 
balance out with the hedge, if we mentally reconstruct the image—but also because, as 
we saw above with William Bankes, painting has an intimate connection to interpersonal 
intimacy. If we think of Lily’s canvas as a performance or an instantiation of backward 
subjectivity, then her immediate attention to it here suggests that her vision of Mrs. 
Ramsay is indeed not a memory, but a crucial bearing-along-with: much like Orlando, 
Lily cannot help but carry history, people, experiences around with her. To put it 
differently, the vision of Mrs. Ramsay lets us see in action Lily’s ontological instability 
of self as well as her modernist individualism: her role as artistic visionary and her more-
than-one voice11 collide here in a moment that compresses past and vision into a present 
of artistic creation. 
 Just as with Orlando, however, not all of these collisions are pleasurable in To the 
Lighthouse; the backward subject-position is at least as much about subsuming a history 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Yet again, I am referring to G.M. Hyde’s formulation (339). 
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of violence or exclusion into the self as it is about experiencing intimacy. Charles 
Tansley is, naturally, the best example in the text of this aspect of Woolf’s revision of 
subjectivity. After butting heads with Charles somewhat in “The Window,” Lily first sits 
down in “The Lighthouse” to paint only to be interrupted by the now-gone Tansley:  
her mind kept throwing up from its depths, scenes, and names, and  
sayings, and memories and ideas, like a fountain spurting over that 
glaring, hideously difficult white space, while she modeled it with greens 
and blues. 
Charles Tansley used to say that, she remembered, women can’t paint,  
can’t write. (238) 
The passage begins with her focusing into the painting, experiencing her artistic 
creation—as I have already suggested—in the context of her identity and history: the 
“scenes” and “names” help, in the metaphor Lily sets up, to cover the problematic space 
on the canvas. Quite literally, her recollection of what I have generally called the 
ancestral helps her work. It helps, anyway, until somewhere in that long catalogue of 
encounters, names, and faces, Charles Tansley comes to her consciousness, uttering 
across the gulf of years his forbidding mantra: “women can’t paint, can’t write.” While 
Lily’s recollection of Charles subsequently stimulates her to remember a pleasant 
memory with him—notably facilitated by Mrs. Ramsay’s very presence—the interruption 
posed by his initial intrusion into the scene of focus persists. Indeed, Lily’s focus on the 
piece itself does not return until much later and then again with Mrs. Ramsay’s ghostly 
presence enabling her: “and as she dipped into the blue paint, she dipped too into the past 
there. Now Mrs. Ramsay got up,” she remembers (256). 
 Doubtlessly, part of Charles Tansley’s presence is disturbing: as he is pressed into 
Lily’s present, he seems to interrupt the metaphor that introduces him. Tansley, we might 
gather, is not part of the fountain helping to cover the “ghastly” white space. And yet, he 
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is the first concrete name that Lily runs across in this moment of trying to attain focus. 
His shared presence with Mrs. Ramsay suggests that Lily carries around more than just 
pleasurable identifications when she returns to finish her painting. Tansley’s insult 
provokes Lily, and reminds us of the impenetrability of a gender-biased arena of cultural 
production: for Lily just as for Orlando, the past cannot help but bring to mind the unique 
opportunity of modernity and with it, the pain of keeping that exclusionary history close. 
While Mrs. Ramsay inspires Lily’s creative visions most directly, it remains significant 
that Charles—also left behind in the gulf of “Time Passes” persists into the final section 
of the book. The different temporal operation, collapsing or flattening, yields the same 
revision of subject-position: Lily is perpetually speaking—or painting—as more than “I,” 
but as an I situated in a nexus of “names” “scenes” “memories” and “ideas” that make up 
a whole, multivalent self (238). 
 The importance of the individualist creator at the kernel of that multivalent self is 
crucial to maintain, however. I do not mean to argue that Woolf dispenses with the 
archetypical modernist mode of self-styling; after all, the Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography calls Woolf the “high priestess of modernism”—and it is important to 
remember Woolf’s preeminence in the modernist canon. The fact that To the Lighthouse 
ends with Lily’s completion of her painting is significant. The piece is described not just 
in terms of imagery but also in terms of intent: “with all its greens and blues, its lines 
running up and across, its attempt at something. It would be hung in the attics, she 
thought; it would be destroyed. But what did that matter?” (309-10). The painting is an 
essay in the French sense of the word: it is a shot at something, a formal experiment. It is 
about itself, an attempt maybe more at formalizing a correspondence between 
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“reverencing” and non-mimetic artistic practice than it is about the finished product. In 
this manner, we can see Woolf’s dedication to the traditional modernist paradigm: Lily 
Briscoe the creator is in many ways, the lonely voice that Mina Loy describes, and 
stressing this ground in modernism is important to maintain. 
 Still, the text leaves us with a parting turn away from such a clear interpretation of 
the matter. As Lily draws the line that completes the painting, the narrative voice 
declares: “It was done; it was finished,” mimicking in the second clause the exact words 
of Lily at realizing Mr. Ramsay had landed at the lighthouse (310). Rather than 
speculating to death about the lighthouse itself, I only mean to argue this about this final 
curious echo that ushers us out of Lily’s creative struggle: even in the moment of Lily’s 
greatest “intensity” (ibid), the moment that is easiest to read as a paradigmatic modernist 
creator, the text gives us a shred of something backward. This paper begins with a 
reference to the “razor edge” of balance that Lily tries to strike between her painting and 
Mr. Ramsay (287). In repeating the words between Mr. Ramsay’s landing and the final 
stroke of Lily’s painting, the text firmly yokes together the two, reminding us that artistic 
creation does not happen in a vacuum. Indeed, Lily cannot bring herself to finish until 
seeing Mr. Ramsay’s goal finished, and while the intimate logic of this moment is 
difficult to plumb, it does indicate to us a similar place in Lily’s identificatory spectrum 
for Mr. Ramsay. Woolf’s revision, even when subtle, insists on a new conceptualization 
of the subject in modernism because it strives to understand the self—especially the 
creator—situated in history (of which time is, naturally, a component). 
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 As I alluded to near the end of Section IV, Woolf’s revision of subjectivity 
perhaps carries with it an ethical imperative. Backward subjectivity, as I have framed it 
here, suggests first an ethics of creation: in participating in the realm of cultural 
production, we bear the history that precedes us, even when we might otherwise wish to 
put it aside in an otherwise ameliorative effort. It also suggests a problem with denying 
this reality: in taking an oppositionalist stand, as the Futurists do, the subject risks 
eradicating the fullness of a history that includes both pleasant events and obstacles. For 
Woolf’s creator-characters, this is not even a choice: Woolf theorizes her revision of 
subjectivity not as a conscious self-styling but the only way of being in a world burdened 
by memory. The experience of ancestry, whether it is through reading (as in Orlando) or 
direct (as in To the Lighthouse) and whether facilitative or troublesome, forms the 
subject. Anthony Giddens suggests about traditional modernism that only given a specific 
conceptualization of time can modernism have come about. For Woolf’s revision of the 
modern subject, only the Bergsonian innovation of elastic temporality permits the radical 
reimaginings of identity that such a model proposes. In generating a systematic 
articulation of the backward subject in Woolf’s artist-novels, I hope to provide a critical 
tool that stimulates reimaginings of other modernist approaches to subjectivity.  
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